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Abstract
In the Freedom Essay Schelling provides four different accounts of the
copula, two of which are largely implicit. In this paper I focus on the
first of these accounts, which I call the “mediated account.” I argue
that this explanation of the copula articulates a fundamental ontologi-
cal structure in Schelling’s philosophy. In the first half of the paper I
analyze the structural features of the account, drawing on Schelling’s
more extensive treatment in the Ages of the World. In the second half
of the paper I argue that Schelling’s fundamental distinction between
that-which-exists and the ground of existence exhibits the same struc-
ture as the mediated account of the copula. This has implications for
understanding the enigmatic relationship of these two principles to the
Ungrund. I conclude by briefly suggesting other applications of this
fundamental structure in Schelling’s philosophy.
Near the beginning of the Freedom Essay Schelling provides an ex-
tended discussion of the copula – the word “is” in judgments, when it
connects subject and predicate. At first glance, the purpose of this dis-
cussion seems to be to shed light on the meaning of pantheism, which is
the subject of this part of the treatise. The word “pantheism” implies
that there is an identity of all things with God – an identity that can be
expressed in the statement: “God is all things.” But what is the nature
of this identity? In other words, what is the meaning of the word “is” in
the sentence “God is all things”? One misinterpretation of pantheism
results from interpreting this identity as complete sameness or lack of
difference: “God is all things” means “There is no difference between
God and things.” According to Schelling, however, the word “is” in this
sentence does not mean that the subject (“God”) is completely the
same as the predicate (“all things”). Indeed, the identity between sub-
ject and predicate also requires difference, if the sentence is to be mean-
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ingful. Thus the statement “God is all things” not only allows but
requires things to be meaningfully differentiated from God.
In the course of the discussion of the copula, Schelling provides four
different accounts of its meaning – two of which are largely implicit.1
On the surface, these accounts might seem to be Schelling’s contribu-
tion to the philosophy of language or logic (in the narrow sense). Thus
Schelling’s intention would merely be to clarify the logic of the copula
in order to correct a mistaken conception of pantheism. Below the sur-
face, however, the logic of the copula has implications that go beyond
mere logic: the logic of the copula expresses fundamental features of
Schelling’s ontology. Schelling hints at these deeper implications when
he associates a misunderstanding of the copula with a misunderstand-
ing of the law of identity,2 which he had long regarded as the principle
of his philosophy.
In this essay I will focus on the first of the four accounts in the
Freedom Essay, which I call the “mediated account.” According to this
account, the copula connects the subject and predicate through an un-
derlying substratum, which does not appear at all in the original sen-
tence. I argue that this account of the copula articulates a fundamental
ontological structure in Schelling’s philosophy. In particular, this ac-
count of the copula provides a key to understanding Schelling’s funda-
mental distinction between that-which-exists and the ground of exis-
tence, as well as the enigmatic relationship of this distinction to the
Ungrund.
In the first part of this essay I will outline the general features of the
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1 According to my count, his four explanations are the following: (1) the subject has a
mediated connection with the predicate (the account treated in this essay); (2) the sub-
ject relates to the predicate as antecedens to consequens; (3) the subject relates to the
predicate as implicitum to explicitum; and (4) the subject relates to the predicate as
ground to consequence. The first three are contained in Schelling’s discussion of the
copula at Schelling 2006, 13 f. / SW VII, 341 f. The fourth is only explicitly mentioned
later (cf. Schelling 2006, 17 / SW VII, 345f.). One can pose the question of how these
accounts relate to each other and whether they are incompatible. I will not be treating
this question here. My own position is that these accounts do not contradict one an-
other, and all four accounts apply to sentences in ordinary language. However, not all
accounts apply to certain “speculative” sentences like das Gute ist das Böse: it does not
seen that one can apply the third account to this sentence.
2 Cf. Schelling 2006, 13 / SW VII, 341. Citations from the Freedom Essay are drawn
from Schelling 2006 with some slight modifications. All other translations of Schelling
are my own.
mediated account, supplementing what Schelling says in the Freedom
Essay with his more developed treatment in the Ages of the World. In
the second section I will examine more closely the structural character-
istics of this account with a view to its ontological implications. In the
third section I turn to the fundamental distinction in the Freedom Es-
say and the relationship of this distinction to the Ungrund. Here I will
attempt to show how the fundamental distinction displays the same
structure that is articulated in the account of the copula. In the final
section I will conclude by suggesting wider applications of this struc-
ture and by posing the question of the place of logic in Schelling’s
philosophy.
1.
In light of the privileged place that Schelling will later give to the
mediated account of the copula in the Ages of the World, it is curious
that he does not give a direct explanation of it in the Freedom Essay.
Nevertheless, he makes an indirect reference to this account immedi-
ately after introducing the topic of identity: “[I]n no possible proposi-
tion […] is stated a sameness or even an unmediated connection of [the
subject and predicate, M. T.].”3 No possible proposition states “an un-
mediated connection.” This means that all propositions state a
mediated connection of the subject and predicate. But what kind of
mediation is involved? Schelling’s interpretation of his first example
sentence provides a clue: “[T]he proposition, ‘This body is blue’, does
not have the meaning that the body is, in and through that in and
through which it is a body, also blue, but rather the meaning that the
same thing which is this body is also blue, although not in the same
respect.”4 In the example sentence the subject “this body” does not
have an immediate connection with the predicate “blue.” Instead they
are connected by virtue of their belonging to “the same thing [das-
selbe].” In other words, the same thing – unnamed in the original sen-
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3 Schelling 2006, 13 / SWVII, 341; trans. modified. Here I believe the phrase “auch nur
ein unvermittelter Zusammenhang” should be translated “even an unmediated connec-
tion,” instead of “even only an unmediated connection.” Nur is here a modal particle,
not an adverb.
4 Schelling 2006, 13 / SW VII, 341; trans. modified.
tence – is both (a) this body and (b) blue. Finally, Schelling adds that the
same thing is not this body and blue “in the same respect [Betracht].”
The same thing is in one respect this body and in another respect blue.
Being this body and being blue are different aspects of the same (under-
lying) thing.
Schelling provides a more explicit and elaborate explanation of the
mediated account in the Ages of the World. In fact, Schelling discusses
the account in all three drafts, and he does not mention any of the other
accounts of the copula that he had provided in the Freedom Essay. I
suspect that the emphasis on this account reflects Schelling’s recogni-
tion of its importance for articulating a fundamental ontological struc-
ture in his philosophy.5 Indeed, the context in the Ages of the World
confirms this structural importance: in each draft the discussion of the
copula arises in the course of a reflection on the relationship between
the two principles in God – although Schelling designates these princi-
ples in different ways. Moreover, in the first two drafts Schelling refers
to the origins of this account in Leibniz’s defense of the Trinity. Leibniz
had sought to explain how God the Father is not the same as God the
Son, even though both are God.6 The Trinitarian origin of the account
is no coincidence: already in the 1802 Further Presentations Schelling
had recognized the significance of the Trinity as a symbol for the three-
in-one structures in his philosophy (cf. SW IV, 390), and Trinitarian
language is prominent in the Freedom Essay.7
In the Ages of the World Schelling expresses the meaning of the
copula symbolically: “The true meaning of every judgment, e. g. ‘A is
B’, can only be this: that which is A is that which is B, or that which is A
and that which is B is the same [einerlei].” (SW VIII, 213) A few lines
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5 The context in the Freedom Essay also gives a possible reason why Schelling does not
emphasize the account there. The context is the discussion of pantheism and the mean-
ing of the identity of God and all things. It is not immediately clear how the mediated
account relates to the question of pantheism. One would have to say that the same thing
that is God is also all things; but what is the “same thing” in this context? The other
accounts of the copula seem to fit better. For example, God relates to all things as ground
to consequence.
6 The name of the text is Defensio trinitatis per nova reperta logica (Defense of the
Trinity by means of New Logical Discoveries), cf. Leibniz 1669. For a discussion of the
context and content of this treatise, cf. Antognazza 2007, 16–33. Leibniz cites the work
of Johann Raue (1610–1679), who first had the insight that the “real copula” is unex-
pressed in the original sentence. Cf. Antognazza 2007, 23 f.
7 Cf. Schelling 2006, 30, 32 / SW VII, 361, 363.
later Schelling introduces the symbol X to represent “the same thing”
that is both A and B. If we apply this symbolism to the example in the
Freedom Essay, A is “this body,” B is “blue,” and X is the unnamed
“same thing” that is both this body and blue. It is noteworthy that
Schelling in this passage states that every judgment has the meaning
given in this account. When we examine the structural features of the
account more closely, we will see that there are difficulties with apply-
ing it universally, and that even the explanation of the account itself
betrays different meanings of the copula.
Before discussing the structural features in more detail, I would like
to mention one other distinctive feature of Schelling’s account. In ex-
plaining the meaning of the sentence “A is B,” Schelling (following
Leibniz) expands this sentence into the form “the same thing (= X) that
is A is also B.” This expanded form introduces elements such as X that
are not mentioned in the original sentence. Accordingly, understanding
the true meaning of the copula involves unfolding elements that are
hidden or implicit in ordinary language. This explains why Schelling
claims – somewhat mysteriously – that the concept is the enveloped
judgment, while the syllogism (Schluß) is the unfolded judgment (cf.
SW VIII, 214; WA I, 28; WA II, 129). The concept is the enveloped
judgment, because implicit in the simple concept A is the judgment “A
is X.” And the syllogism is the unfolded judgment, because implicit in
the judgment “A is B” are three sentences that form a syllogism: (1) A
is X, (2) X is B, therefore (3) A is B. Schelling even expresses his inten-
tion to develop such reflections in a future work on the “noble art of
reason.” (cf. SW VIII, 214) In any case, Schelling emphasizes the con-
nection of this account of the copula to the theme of revealing or un-
folding what is hidden – a theme to which we will return.
2.
With these general characteristics of Schelling’s account in mind, I
would now like to examine more closely its structural features in order
to see how these features reveal a fundamental ontological structure in
Schelling’s philosophy. There are three structural elements in the
mediated account: (I.) the X that is introduced in the explanation,
(II.) the subject and predicate (A and B) in the original sentence, and
(III.) the word “is,” which appears multiple times and in different roles.
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(I.) X is perhaps the most interesting element in the entire account.
Schelling uses the symbol X to represent “the same thing” that is both
A and B. X is the ὑποκείμενον or what underlies both A and B and thus
allows them to be identified. As such, it mediates the identity between
A and B. What is truly remarkable about X is that it does not appear at
all in the original sentence, even though it plays the central role in the
account. In the first draft (1811) of the Ages of the World, Schelling
notes that this X is not always named (cf. WA I, 28), and in the second
draft (1813) he develops this thought further: every judgment affirms
the sameness of that X which unites A and B, “regardless of whether
this really appears [hervortritt] as such, or [remains, M. T.] hidden
[verborgen], or is even something thought.” (WA II, 129)8 The X,
therefore, has an anonymous, hidden character. Heidegger notes in his
interpretation of the Freedom Essay that we typically do not pay atten-
tion to the “is” in sentences but take it for granted.9 Although its
meaning has the greatest importance, it remains hidden in plain sight.
The unnamed X is also ignored, but unlike the “is,” there is no direct
mention of it in most sentences.
The “is” and the X have something else in common: Schelling refers
to both using the Latin word copula and its German equivalent, das
Band. “[I]n no judgment, even in a merely tautological judgment, is
expressed the sameness of what is connected (subject and predicate),
but only a sameness of the being/essence [Wesen], the bond (the copu-
la).” (SW VIII, 213) The Latin word copula means “link” or “bond.”
On a grammatical level, the word “is” serves as the copula, because it
links the subject to the predicate. But on an ontological level, this link-
ing of the subject to the predicate is accomplished by X – the “same
thing” that is in one respect the subject and in another respect the
predicate. Thus, on account of its role in linking the subject and predi-
cate, the words “copula” or “bond” can also refer to this single substra-
tum. The copula, appearing in judgments as the simple word “is,” is
also a something. In fact, in works leading up to the Freedom Essay,
Schelling uses the words “copula” and “bond” as a way of designating
absolute identity.10
Finally, in the passage just cited from the third draft (1814/15),
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8 Cf. WA IV, 263: “das bis dahin verborgene gemeinsame Wesen beyder = X.”
9 Heidegger 1985, 74 f. / Heidegger 1936, 90.
10 Cf. SWVII, 204: “Thus in each thing the copula or absolute identity is the eternal, by
Schelling uses the wordWesen in reference to X. And in the first draft
(1811) Schelling writes: “The bond in the judgment is never a mere
part of it […] but its entire essence [Wesen], and the judgment is really
the unfolded bond itself.” (WA I, 28)11 As is well known, the word
Wesen is one of the most important and most difficult words to trans-
late in Schelling. Like the Greek word οὐσία, Wesen can mean (1) es-
sence or nature, or (2) a being (for example, Lebewesen means “living
being”).12 Both meanings have as their root the meaning “what it
(really) is.”13 I suspect that Schelling often exploits the ambiguity of
the word Wesen in such a way as to move beyond the distinction be-
tween the two meanings. In the context of the copula, both senses ap-
ply. On the one hand, the copula is a being – a substratum that under-
lies both subject and predicate. On the other hand, the copula is the
essence of the judgment: the true nature of the judgment – what it is
essentially – is the copula. The wordWesen will be important when we
relate this account of the copula to the fundamental distinction in the
Freedom Essay.14
(II.) The subject and the predicate (A and B) are the next structural
elements in Schelling’s account. They are what is connected (das Ver-
bundene) by the copula (cf. SW VIII, 213). But what precise status do
they have in relation to X? We can take a first clue from Schelling’s
interpretation of the sentence “The body is blue” in the Freedom Essay.
Schelling expands this sentence to read: “[T]he same thing which is this
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which the thing itself is immediately resolved [aufgelöst] in the creating substance.” Cf.
also SW VII, 56–59 and SW II, 360–362.
11 The theme of unfolding appears again in this passage, but this unfolding is different
from the unfolding we discussed before. Here things are unfolded out of X, whereas
before X was unfolded out of the judgment “A is B”.
12 Wesen can also have a third, verbal meaning in connection with its etymological
relation to the verb Sein. Thus Schelling refers to das rein Wesende (cf. SW XIII, 212;
SW II, 364). I thank Philipp Höfele (Freiburg) and Iain Grant (Bristol) for calling my
attention to this meaning in our conversations.
13 In Schelling’s dialogue Clara the pastor asks: “In this bodily state is [not] the essence
[Wesen] of the human being, or what is really human in man [das eigentlich Mens-
chliche im Menschen], the soul?” (SW IX, 51).
14 Schelling also uses the wordWesen in explaining his fourth example of the copula in
the Freedom Essay, for which he also (implicitly) makes use of the mediated account of
the copula: “[W]hat is necessary [Notwendiges] and what is free [Freies] are explained
as one, the meaning of which is that the same thing [dasselbe] (in the last analysis)
which is the essence [Wesen] of the moral world is also the essence of nature” (Schelling
2006, 13 f. / SW VII, 342; trans. modified).
body is also blue, although not in the same respect [in dem nämlichen
Betracht].”15 The subject (“this body”) and the predicate (“blue”) are
both respects or ways of regarding the same underlying X: it is in one
respect this body and in another respect blue.16 Because they are differ-
ent respects, there is no contradiction if both are identified with X, even
though they are different. The principle of contradiction in Aristotle
reads: “[T]he same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not
belong to the same subject in the same respect.”17
The fact that A and B are both aspects of X has an interesting con-
sequence: both have the same relationship to X. As a result, it makes no
difference which is the subject and which is the predicate – at least if
this is a complete account of the meaning of the copula, which seems to
be Schelling’s intention in the Ages of the World.18 Accordingly, “A is
B” means the same as “B is A”: judgments of identity are symmetri-
cal.19 This is significantly different from the other accounts of the co-
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15 Schelling 2006, 13 / SW VII, 341.
16 Schelling even cites an example from Leibniz, in which the same thing is in one part
(einem Theil nach) wood and in another part iron (cf. WA I, 28). Thus it is the divisi-
bility of this single substratum, or its ability to be considered in different respects, that
allows it to join the subject and the predicate together in identity despite the difference
between them. This recalls the task resolved by the third principle in Fichte’s 1794
Wissenschaftslehre. The I and the not-I can be united in a single consciousness, because
this consciousness is divisible (teilbar): it is in one part the I, and in another part the not-
I. Thus one can rightfully say that the I is the not-I.
17 Aristotle 1984, 1588 (Metaphysics IV 1005b19 f.); my emphasis: “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα
ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό.” Cf. Schelling’s
use of the preposition nach (the equivalent of the Greek κατὰ) to mark out different
aspects of the human being, thus applying the structure of his account of the copula (cf.
SW VIII, 214f.).
18 In contrast, Schelling provides other accounts of the copula in the Freedom Essay, and
these accounts are not symmetrical. These accounts may serve the role of supplement-
ing the mediated account, which (at least in certain contexts) is incomplete. In any case,
it does not seem coincidental that Schelling designates the ideal principle with the sym-
bol A and makes this the subject of the sentence: Schelling had long associated the ideal
with the subject and the real with the object or predicate of a sentence.
19 Bernhard Rang also notes this symmetry in Schelling’s account in the Ages of the
World. Cf. Rang 2000, 19. Wolfram Hogrebe, in contrast, interprets them asymmetri-
cally. He translates Schelling’s account into predicate logic as follows: Fa ! (9x) (x =
a^Fx), where A = a, B = F, and X = x. This means that B is a predicate, whereas A is a
singular term that is completely interchangeable with X. Cf. Hogrebe 1989, 81 f. I do not
believe this interpretation has an adequate basis in the text, and it seems to undermine
the significance of the copula (X) as what mediates the identity between A and B.
pula in the Freedom Essay. For example, if the subject relates to the
predicate as what is enfolded to what is unfolded (implicitum et expli-
citum), the meaning of “A is B” is quite different from “B is A.”20
The question of symmetry is related to the place of predication in
the account. Remarkably, in the first draft of the Ages of the World
Schelling describes X as “that same thing of which the subject and
predicate are both predicates.” (WA I, 28) Both A and B have the same
status: both are predicates of X. As a consequence, B is both a predicate
of A and a predicate of X – although its status as predicate of A does not
seem to be relevant in this account. In any case, X assumes the place of
a subject that underlies the predicates, following the traditional Aristo-
telian scheme. And yet, we will see ways in which Schelling’s account
does not follow the Aristotelian model. For one thing, although Schel-
ling characterizes A and B as predicates or aspects of X, he also gives
them a substance-like character. For example, he writes that the subject
and predicate are “each for themselves already a unity” and the copula
is the unity of these unities (SW VIII, 214). This mixed status of A and
B – sharing traditional features of both substances and predicates – is
also a characteristic of the potencies in Schelling, as well as the modes
of substance in Spinoza.
One final way to characterize A and B is in terms of revelation. We
saw before that X has a hidden, anonymous character and does not even
appear in the original judgment. A and B are therefore ways of reveal-
ing X, or ways of allowing X to come to appearance. In itself X is in-
accessible.21 In fact, in the first draft of the Ages of the World (1811)
Schelling calls the judgment “A is B” the “unfolded bond” or copula
(WA I, 28). This implies that A and B are previously enfolded in X, and
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20 Cf. Schelling 2006, 14 / SW VII, 342.
21 In a remarkable passage in the Prolegomena Kant writes: “It has long since been
noticed that in all substances the subject proper, namely what is left over after all acci-
dents (as predicates) have been taken away and hence the substantial itself, is unknown
to us […] Pure reason demands that for every predicate of a thing we should look for its
appropriate subject, and for this, which is again necessarily only a predicate, its subject
and so on to infinity (or as far as we can reach). But it follows from this that nothing
which we can reach ought to be taken as a final subject, and that the substantial itself can
never be thought by our understanding, however deeply it penetrated, and even if the
whole of nature were disclosed to it; because the specific nature of our understanding
consists in thinking everything discursively, i. e. through concepts, and hence through
nothing but predicates, to which the absolute subject must always be lacking” (Kant
2004, 137f. / Prol., AA 4, 333).
by being unfolded in the judgment they reveal explicitly what X was
implicitly.
(III.) The final structural element in the account is the word “is.”
This is, of course, the word that the account of the copula is meant to
explain. But something interesting happens in the course of this expla-
nation. We start with a single “is” in the simple judgment “A is B.” But
in Schelling’s explanation of the meaning of this judgment, the “is’s”
are multiplied: “That which is A is that which is B,” or “The X that is A
and the X that is B is the same” (SW VIII, 213; my emphasis). Now
instead of just one, we have three instances of the word “is.” The ques-
tion therefore arises: does the word “is” have the same meaning in each
of these instances? It seems as if Schelling’s answer is yes. As we noted
above, Schelling states that his explanation applies to every judgment.
This account of the copula would therefore apply not only to “A is B”
but to the various statements that are part of the explanation of “A is
B”: “X is A,” “X is B,” and even “X is X.” But if the account of the
copula applies to itself, this would lead to an infinite regress. It would
also require an infinite multiplication of the word “is” as well as the
number of underlying substrates that would take the place of X. “X is
A” would mean “The same Y that is X is also A.” But then “Y is X”
would mean “The same Z that is Y is also X.” And so forth. Each
attempt to explain the copula introduces more copulas that require ex-
planation.
Despite Schelling’s claim of universality for his account, we can ac-
tually distinguish three different uses of the word “is” and thereby
avoid this regress. Each of these three uses of the word “is” corresponds
to a different kind of identity.
(i) The use of the word “is” in the sentence “A is B” is the one that
Schelling explicitly treats. We can call the identity expressed by this
use of the copula a mediated identity because A and B are identified
only through the mediation of X. Schelling also refers to this as a
“doubled identity [verdoppelte Identität]” (cf. WA I, 28), or a “unity
of unities” (WA II, 129; SWVIII, 214), since A and B are each already a
unity.
(ii) The use of the word “is” in the statements “X is A” or “X is B”22
does not express a mediated identity. Instead they express the immedi-
29
The Mediation of the Copula as a Fundamental Structure
22 One can pose the question whether one should write “X is A” or “A is X.” I prefer “X
is A,” since this places X in the place of the subject and A in the place of the predicate,
ate identity of the underlying substrate (X) with one of its forms or
aspects. As we noted above, Schelling uses the wordWesen in reference
to X: it is the “essence” of both A and B, or the “being” that underlies
them. Accordingly, since “X is A” identifies Awith its “being/essence,”
we can call this an essential identity.23
(iii) Finally, Schelling also uses the word “is” in his account to iden-
tify the X that is A and the X that is B – in other words, to identify X
with itself. Remarkably, Schelling uses the German word einerlei to
express this identity: “The X that is A and the X that is B is the same
[einerlei], namely the very same [dasselbe] X” (SW VIII, 213).24 Einer-
leiheit for Schelling means complete sameness, or identity without dif-
ference. This is reinforced by Schelling’s use of the word dasselbe (“the
very same”) both in this sentence and in the example in the Freedom
Essay. We can therefore call the identity expressed here numerical
identity or complete sameness. It is remarkable that this kind of iden-
tity plays an important role in Schelling’s account of the copula, since
he seems to be dismissive of a conception of identity as Einerleiheit in
the Freedom Essay.25 Here we see that Einerleiheit is one of the essen-
tial moments in understanding the copula. Indeed, far from expressing
a single kind of identity, the copula articulates a complex structure with
three different kinds of identity expressed within it.
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thus reflecting their ontological relationship. Schelling, however, seems to prefer the
other formulation. In the second and third drafts of the Ages of the World, he writes
“A ist = X” and “B ist = X” (WA II, 129; cf. SWVIII, 214). In the first draft, however, he
writes “A ist X” and “X ist B” (WA I, 28). In other instances it is ambiguous which is
subject and which is predicate, because the statement appears in a dependent clause: das,
was A ist can mean either (1) that which is A, or (2) that which A is. In any case,
Schelling does not seem to emphasize the difference between the subject and predicate
positions in these sentences.
23 However, this designation is potentially misleading, since Schelling also calls the first
kind of identity (mediated identity) an “essential unity,” since things are united by
virtue of sharing the same essence (cf. SW VII, 422).
24 Immediately before this Schelling writes that a judgment does not express the same-
ness (Einerleiheit) of the subject and the predicate but rather the sameness (Einerleiheit)
of the essence or copula.
25 Cf. Schelling 2006, 13–15 / SW VII, 341, 342 f.n.
3.
With these structural features of Schelling’s account of the copula in
mind, I now want to turn to Schelling’s fundamental distinction in the
Freedom Essay. Here we will see that this distinction exhibits the same
structure as the mediated account of the copula. Accordingly, we can
use Schelling’s account of the copula to help us understand the funda-
mental distinction, as well as the enigmatic relationship of this distinc-
tion to the Ungrund. The importance of the fundamental distinction
for the Freedom Essay cannot be overstated: Schelling notes that his
investigation is based upon it,26 and it is connected to all of the major
themes in the work. For our purposes I want to focus on certain struc-
tural features of the distinction that relate it to Schelling’s account of
the copula.
These structural features are evident in Schelling’s first formulation
of the distinction: “The philosophy of nature of our time has first ad-
vanced in science the distinction between being [Wesen] insofar as it
exists and being [Wesen] insofar as it is merely the ground of exis-
tence.”27 There are two words that appear twice in this formulation:
the word Wesen (“being/essence”) and the word sofern (“insofar as”).
The distinction concerns a single being (Wesen), which is considered in
two respects: in one respect it is that-which-exists (das Existierende), in
another respect it is the ground of existence.
The distinction of two aspects of a single, underlying being is also a
feature of the mediated account of the copula, as we saw above. Accord-
ingly, we can reformulate the fundamental distinction in terms of
Schelling’s account of the copula: The same being (= X) that (in one
respect) is that-which-exists is (in another respect) the ground of ex-
istence. In the first formulation of the distinction, being (Wesen) corre-
sponds to X, that-which-exists corresponds to A, and the ground of
existence corresponds to B.
We noted above that Schelling also uses the word Wesen in refer-
ence to X in the Ages of the World. The being (Wesen) mentioned in
the fundamental distinction shares another feature with X: its hidden
or withdrawn character. Indeed, it is easy to forget that the distinction
concerns this single being, since it seems to disappear from Schelling’s
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26 Cf. Schelling 2006, 27 / SW VII, 357.
27 Schelling 2006, 27 / SW VII, 357; trans. modified.
subsequent discussion. For the greater part of the Freedom Essay
Schelling develops the relationship between that-which-exists and the
ground of existence without reference to any being that underlies the
two. And yet it is my contention that this being (Wesen) reappears
towards the end of the Freedom Essay in the discussion of the Un-
grund. In fact, when Schelling states his intention to explain the Un-
grund “completely determinately,” he reintroduces the word Wesen:
“The being/essence [Wesen] of the ground, as of that-which-exists,
can only be that which comes before all ground, thus, the absolute
considered simpliciter, the non-ground.”28 The Ungrund is the Wesen
that underlies the ground and that-which-exists. In terms of Schel-
ling’s account of the copula, the Ungrund is the X.
Admittedly, Schelling’s use of the word Wesen in this passage is
somewhat ambiguous. What is the precise meaning of the genitive in
the phrase “being/essence [Wesen] of the ground”? Schelling provides
a clearer formulation in his published reply to Eschenmayer concern-
ing the Freedom Essay:
God has the ground of his existence in himself, in his own original being/
essence [Urwesen], to which the existing God (God as subject of existence)
also belongs. In my treatise I designate clearly enough this original being/
essence [Urwesen], from which God himself only steps forth through the
act of his manifestation (S. 497). (SW VIII, 165)
Here Schelling cites the passage on the Ungrund in the Freedom Es-
say.29 A few lines later Schelling adds: “[P]recisely because [the two
principles, M. T.] belong to a single being/essence [Wesen], they must
be distinguished, even opposed in another respect.” (SWVIII, 165) The
Ungrund is therefore a being (Wesen) to which the two principles be-
long. The German phrase that I have translated “belong to [gehören
zu]” does not indicate possession, but rather that the two principles are
constituents of a larger whole, which is theUngrund. This also explains
the sense of the genitive in the passage from the Freedom Essay: the
Ungrund is the being (Wesen) of each principle in the sense that each
principle belongs to this being.30
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28 Schelling 2006, 69 f. / SW VII, 407 f.; trans. modified.
29 “S. 497” in the original edition, cf. Schelling 2006, 68 / SW VII, 406.
30 This use of the genitive may seem backward: would it not make more sense to use the
genitive case for that to which something belongs, and not that which belongs to some-
thing else? Nevertheless, this use of the genitive is common in everyday language. For
Finally, we noted that Schelling in the first draft of the Ages of the
World refers to A and B as predicates of X. In the passage in the Free-
dom Essay, the two principles are also predicates of the Ungrund –
although they are predicates of a peculiar sort: they are predicated as
non-opposites and each for itself.31 Moreover, even though they are
predicated of the Ungrund, the two principles also have a substance-
like character, which one would not usually associate with predicates.
Thus, Schelling refers to them as “principles,” as well as “forces” and
even “wills.” We have seen that this is also a feature of A and B in the
account of the copula: although they are aspects and predicates of X,
each is itself already a “unity.”
What conclusions can we draw from these parallels between the
fundamental distinction and Schelling’s account of the copula? First,
the account of the copula provides us with a way to articulate the rela-
tionship between the Ungrund and the two principles. The Ungrund is
the copula or what connects that-which-exists and the ground of exis-
tence. By underlying both principles, it gives them a “mediated” unity:
the same being/essence that exists is also the ground of existence. The
principles are not related directly in this unity, but only through a
mediating X: in the Freedom Essay Schelling expresses this absence of
any direct relation by saying that the principles are predicated “in dis-
junction and each for itself.”32 By providing this mediated unity, the
Ungrund serves an important dual function. On the one hand, it gives
the system an ultimate unity, since both principles are predicated of a
single X. On the other hand, since the principles are not related directly,
it allows for them to maintain their independence from each other and
thus their genuine distinction.33
Moreover, the account of the copula can help us to understand one
of the other puzzling features of the Ungrund: its lack of predicates.34
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example, in the phrase “my parents’ community,” the word in the genitive case (“par-
ents”) refers to constituents of a larger whole (their community).
31 Cf. Schelling 2006, 69 / SW VII, 407.
32 Schelling 2006, 69 / SW VII, 407.
33 As Manfred Frank notes in his interpretation of Schelling’s account of the copula,
“[d]ie Identität besteht vor dem In-Beziehung-Setzen.” (Frank 1985, 121) In my inter-
pretation of the Ungrund this lack of relation is essential and connects the Ungrund to
Schelling’s previous accounts of the absolute. Cf. SW VII, 154: “Nothing in relation,
thus nothing that can stand in opposition, is affirmable through reason and of God.”
34 Cf. Schelling 2006, 69 / SW VII, 406.
How can the Ungrund lack any predicate when Schelling also affirms
that the two principles can be predicated of the Ungrund? We can un-
derstand this in terms of X in the account of the copula. In one sense, A
and B are the predicates of X. But one can also ask what X is in itself, or
what is it that underlies the predicates. As what underlies A and B, X is
neither A nor B: it has no predicates, but lies hidden and anonymous.
This explains why Schelling uses the phrase “Neither-Nor [Weder –
Noch]”35 in the discussion of the Ungrund: though both principles are
predicated of it, considered in itself it is neither the one nor the other.36
However, it is important to note that the relationship between the
principles and the Ungrund is more complex than the relationship be-
tween predicates and an underlying substrate. We already noted that
the principles themselves have a substance-like character. In addition,
Schelling writes that the Ungrund is in each of the principles the
whole.37 Thus, the principles are not only in the Ungrund (as its pre-
dicates): the Ungrund is in the principles!38 There is a sense in which
this is also true in the account of the copula, as we have seen. The
concept is the “enveloped judgment,” because implicit in the simple
concept A is the judgment “A is X,” and implicit in the simple concept
B is the judgment “B is X.” This implies that X must somehow already
be contained in the concepts of A and B; otherwise it could not appear in
the corresponding judgments, which are unfolded out of A and B.
4.
We have seen how Schelling’s mediated account of the copula articu-
lates an ontological structure, and that the fundamental distinction in
the Freedom Essay exhibits this same structure. I want to conclude by
indicating wider applications of this structure in Schelling’s philosophy.
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35 Schelling 2006, 69 / SW VII, 407.
36 Cf. Schelling’s use of the neither-nor construction in Philosophy and Religion (cf.
SW VI, 23 f.).
37 Cf. Schelling 2006, 70 / SW VII, 408.
38 Cf. the following passage from the Stuttgart Private Lectures: “An essential unity is
meant; one and the same thing [Sache] is posited in both forms, but it is in each of these
form its own being [Wesen] and not the very same being. […] Because the same being/
essence [Wesen] is in each one, there is between them an essential […] unity” (SW VII,
422).
First, from its application to the fundamental distinction we can con-
clude that this is not just one ontological structure among many, but
the basic structure at all levels of reality. This is because the distinction
not only pertains to God, but to all things, including human beings.
Indeed, after Schelling’s initial characterization of the distinction in
God he adds: “A reflection starting out from things leads to this same
distinction.”39 A little later in the Freedom Essay Schelling notes that
“both principles are indeed in all things.”40 Accordingly, this distinction
articulates a fundamental structure of reality, which can be applied at
every level of the system.41 And since essential elements in this struc-
ture are articulated in the mediated account of the copula, we can con-
clude that the account of the copula expresses a fundamental ontologi-
cal structure for Schelling’s philosophy.
But this structure is not new with the Freedom Essay. Indeed, I want
to suggest that it also characterizes the doctrine of potencies in Schel-
ling’s philosophy of identity and beyond. There are many difficult
questions surrounding the concept of potency at the various stages in
Schelling’s philosophical development, and I do not want to suggest
that Schelling has a single Potenzenlehre that applies throughout his
writings. Nevertheless, there are certain general features of the poten-
cies that we can relate to the account of the copula. In general, the
potencies are different forms or ways of expressing a single underlying
reality. If we apply Schelling’s logical symbolism, X is this single under-
lying reality, and A and B are different potencies. The same thing (= X)
that is one potency is also another potency, though not in the same
respect. Considered in itself, the underlying reality is without potencies
(potenzlos) (cf. SW VI, 212) – just like X, considered in itself, is hidden
and without predicates. All the potencies are one, because they all have
the same essence (Wesen). (Schelling refers to this as qualitative indif-
ference, at least early on in his Identitätsphilosophie.) We can therefore
say that this single essence is the copula of the potencies in the sense of
the mediated account: the potencies are not united here directly, but
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39 Schelling 2006, 28 / SW VII, 358.
40 Schelling 2006, 32 / SW VII, 363.
41 According to Heidegger, Schelling’s distinction constitutes the basic structure
(Grundgefüge) or determination of “self-contained being[s] [des in sich stehenden
Seienden]” (cf. Heidegger 1985, 107 / Heidegger 1936, 129). Heidegger thus labels the
distinction the “jointure of Being [Seynsfuge]” (Heidegger 1985, 108 / Heidegger 1936,
130).
through the mediation of a common essence. Moreover, as the poten-
cies unfold they come to reveal different aspects of this essence, just as
the predicates A and B reveal different aspects of a hidden X.
This unfolding of the potencies is a development – both in the gen-
eral sense of a gradual process and in the etymological sense of unfold-
ing what was previously enfolded or enclosed. Indeed, every develop-
ment shares the structure articulated in the mediated account of the
copula. We can see this clearly if we consider the place of identity and
difference in the concept of development. A development unfolds in
different moments or stages – regardless of whether it is the develop-
ment of the cosmos or the life of a human being. Despite their differ-
ence, the moments of the development form a unity insofar as a single
being (= X) underlies them. The development is a development of a
single being. In one of the fragments of theAges of theWorld Schelling
expresses these structural features of development in the same lan-
guage he had used in the account of the copula:
In every development there is sameness of the being/essence [Einerley-
heit desWesens], thus one and the same being/essence is the first, the last,
and what is in the middle between them. Therefore, as that which these
are, this one being/essence is outside of the development und thus outside
and above time as well. (WA III, 208)
Here Schelling uses the term Einerleyheit with respect to the being/
essence underlying the development, just as he had used this term with
reference to X in the account of the copula. The different moments in
the development are all identified with the same being (= X), and this
allows them to be identified with each other: that which is first (= A) is
that which is last (= B), because the same thing (= X) that is the first is
also the last.42
One of the most remarkable applications of this structure to devel-
opment is Schelling’s interpretation of the tetragrammaton (yhwh),
the “untranslatable” name of God given to Moses. According to Schel-
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42 Cf. Schelling’s reply to Jacobi concerning the question of whether we can have im-
mediate knowledge of a personal God. Through reason we can have immediate knowl-
edge of absolute identity, but this is not yet knowledge of a personal God: “To be sure,
this knowledge is a knowledge of God to the extent that the being/essence of that abso-
lute identity is implicite God – or, to be more precise, it is the very same being/essence
[dasselbe Wesen] that is transfigured into the personal God. […] I posit God as the first
and as the last, as Α and as O, but as the A he is not what he is as the O” (SW VIII, 81).
ling’s account in the Ages of the World, this name expresses the divine
consciousness of eternity, which he renders in the form of a statement:
“I am who I was; I was who I will be; I will be who I am.” (SW VIII,
263f.)43 In this statement God (the divine “I”) expresses his conscious-
ness of his own eternal identity in and through the various moments of
the divine life. “I was who I will be” because the same thing (= X, = the
eternal “I”) that I was (= A) is also what I will be (= B). Moreover,
Schelling notes that it is not enough that God recognizes himself as
the one who was, is, and will be; God must also recognize himself as
the one who is the same (Derselbe) as the one who was, is, and will be
(cf. SW VIII, 264).44
* * *
Having noted that Schelling’s mediated account of the copula articu-
lates a fundamental ontological structure in his philosophy, we can
conclude with the question: why does his explanation of the copula
reflect his ontology? Did the logic come first? Or (what seems more
probable) is Schelling reading elements of his ontology back into his
account of the copula?45 There may be some truth to the latter charge,
since some of the language he uses in the account seems to be designed
for application to the “speculative” elements of his philosophy and
does not serve as well for interpreting the copula in ordinary lan-
guage.46 Nevertheless, these questions presuppose something that
37
The Mediation of the Copula as a Fundamental Structure
43 Similar statements appear in various fragments of the Ages of the World. For exam-
ple, at the beginning of one fragment, Schelling refers to a story according to which the
primal being addresses the traveler to the temple at Sais from underneath the veil of the
image of Isis: “I am that which was, which is, and which will be; no mortal has lifted my
veil” (WA III, 187).
44 This same developmental structure also applies to the (mysterious) relationship be-
tween love and the Ungrund in the Freedom Essay. The same thing (= X) which is the
Ungrund/indifference (A) is also love (B). Indifference is this X, but “not yet” as love;
love is this X, but “no longer” indifference. It is not clear whether the Ungrund has the
place of X or A in this scheme: this depends on the interpretation of the phrase der
anfängliche Ungrund, and perhaps Schelling intends for it to be ambiguous (cf. Schel-
ling 2006, 68, 70 / SW VII, 406, 408).
45 These are, of course, the same questions that have long been debated in Leibniz
scholarship.
46 For example, Schelling says that both A and B are unities for themselves. This fits
perfectly with his account of the two principles in God, but it does not seem to fit as well
Schelling would reject: the separation of logic from metaphysics or
ontology. Especially in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, we
tend to think of the copula as a theme that belongs to logic or the
philosophy of language, which has no direct relevance to metaphysics.
Schelling, however, does not separate logic in its highest sense from
“metaphysics” or philosophy proper. Any such separation would have
to rest on a distinction between the ideal realm of thought and knowl-
edge (the province of logic) and the real realm of being (the province of
metaphysics). But from the standpoint of reason, the ideal and the real
are originally one.
Of course, this does not mean that all forms of logic reveal the basic
structures of being. Schelling is sometimes very critical of what he
refers to as “common logic,” which is an abstract product of reflection
and distorts reality (cf. SW VI, 150, 185; SW VII, 218). But it would be
a mistake to consider this the only kind of logic. In the 1804Würzburg
System Schelling defines one sense of logic as “what it was for the
Greeks before Aristotle: the science of reason [Vernunftwissenschaft].
Then it is speculative philosophy itself” (SW VI, 529).47 Logic in this
sense is not a mere a tool (ὄργανον) as it was in the Aristotelian tradi-
tion. Schelling transforms logic into a science of reason that is indis-
tinguishable from the highest philosophy. In fact, in the 1806 Aphor-
isms, after rejecting the formal interpretation of the law of identity
characteristic of common logic, Schelling writes: “Regard that law in
itself, know the content that it has, and you will view God” (SW VII,
148). The same could be said of the copula: regard it in itself, know the
content that it has, and you will view God. Logic in its highest form
thus becomes divine contemplation.48
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with sentences in ordinary language like “This body is blue.” Is “blue” already a unity
in itself?
47 In the same passage he also says that logic can mean (2) the system of reflected
knowledge in Kant’s transcendental logic, and (3) logic in the customary, Aristotelian
sense, which is an abstraction from the real (cf. SW VI, 529 f.).
48 This connection between logic and the divine nature is also present in Hegel. In the
introduction to the Science of Logic,Hegel famously remarks that the content of logic is
“the presentation [Darstellung] of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation
of nature and a finite spirit” (WdL, GW 21, 34).
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